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THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF CONTRACTIONIST 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS 
Brian G. Slocum∗ 
The main thesis of Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast’s re-
cent article, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations,1 is im-
portant: the voting decisions of legislators can be influenced by the activist 
statutory interpretations of courts.  Specifically, the authors demonstrate 
that the broad interpretations of progressive legislation made by courts in 
the 1960s and 1970s undermined the legislative deals struck between ardent 
supporters of progressive legislation and the moderate legislators necessary 
for passage of the statutes.  The authors claim the decisions involved “ex-
pansionist,” as opposed to accurate, interpretations because they extended 
the statutes beyond the critical legislators’ understanding of what the statu-
tory language voted upon meant.2  Although these expansionist interpreta-
tions broadened the reach of important progressive legislation, they had the 
effect of discouraging moderate legislators from supporting progressive leg-
islation and are partly to blame for the current polarization of Congress and 
the paucity of such legislation. 
Rodriguez and Weingast explain that courts in the 1960s and 1970s 
were able to achieve expansionist interpretations of progressive legislation 
by misusing legislative history to support inaccurate conclusions about the 
intent or purpose of Congress.3  While the article’s insights about expan-
sionist interpretations and the misuse of legislative history are an important 
contribution to statutory interpretation scholarship, the interpretive mistakes 
made by courts are largely different now than in the 1960s and 1970s.  For 
some time, the dominant trend has been for judges to rely more on rules of 
interpretation that typically narrow statutory meaning and less on pragmatic 
analysis or conclusions about likely congressional intent or purpose.4  Thus, 
if progressive social legislation were enacted today, courts would likely not 
engage in the same improper expansionist interpretations as they did in the 
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past.5  They would, however, likely engage in improper contractionist inter-
pretations that narrow the statutes beyond the critical legislators’ under-
standing of what the statutory language voted upon meant. 
This Essay criticizes the current judicial predilection for contractionist 
statutory interpretations.  Part I explains how the rules of statutory interpre-
tation are currently geared towards producing narrow, often contractionist, 
statutory interpretations.  Part II uses the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
in Zadvydas v. Davis,6 and Clark v. Martinez,7 to illustrate the problems 
raised by contractionist interpretations.  This Part explains that while con-
tractionist interpretations may not discourage moderate legislators from 
supporting legislation, they are problematic because they are inconsistent 
with the judiciary’s role as “faithful agents” of Congress. 
I. THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND 
CONTRACTIONIST INTERPRETATIONS 
A. Distinguishing Contractionist Interpretations from Expansionist 
Interpretations 
As explained above, “expansionist” interpretations extend the meaning 
of statutes beyond the critical legislators’ understanding of what the statu-
tory language voted upon meant.8  Thus, in the spatial model below (which 
the authors utilize in their article), Q is the original status quo prior to the 
legislation.  L is the legislation, and x and x* are two variants of judicial 
changes.  By expansively interpreting the statute, as courts did to progres-
sive statutes in the 1960s and 1970s through overly broad conceptions of 
Congress’s intent or purpose, courts change the original meaning of the 
statute from L further from Q toward x or even beyond x.9 
 
[————x—————L—————x*—————Q————] 
Liberal       Conservative 
Figure 1 
 
As the authors’ explain, these expansionist interpretations can discour-
age moderates from making deals to vote for progressive (or, theoretically, 
conservative) legislation, thereby resulting in the enactment of fewer pro-
gressive (or conservative) statutes.10 
 
5
  Rodriguez and Weingast themselves note that “statutory expansionism abate[d] in the mid-1980s 
and beyond, as more ‘conservative’ courts [have] construed civil rights and other progressive statutes 
more narrowly than before.”  See supra note 1, at 1241–42. 
6
  533 U.S. 678 (2001) (link). 
7
  543 U.S. 371 (2005) (link). 
8
  See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
9
  See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 1, at 1224. 
10
  See id. at 1241. 
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Judicial opinions can also, of course, undermine the original meaning 
of the statute by choosing interpretation x*, which narrows the statute’s ex-
pected meaning.  Rodriguez and Weingast state that the logic of their argu-
ment is “symmetrical with regard to ‘contractionist’ interpretations,” but 
they do not provide an in-depth explanation of how this is so.11  While such 
an exploration was beyond the scope of their main thesis about the para-
doxical nature of expansionist interpretations of progressive legislation, it is 
difficult to imagine that contractionist interpretations raise the same prob-
lems as expansionist interpretations. 
An interpretation that narrows the meaning of a statute results in the 
moderates receiving more than they expected pursuant to their “bargain” 
with ardent supporters.  The contractionist interpretation has made progres-
sive legislation less progressive or conservative legislation less conserva-
tive.  Such a windfall would not likely influence the moderates to refuse to 
support similar legislation in the future.  As explained below, contractionist 
interpretations may reflect the policy interests of the judiciary rather than 
the concerns of moderate legislators, but this does not mean that contrac-
tionist interpretations are unwelcomed by moderates. 
In addition, the possibility of contractionist interpretations may some-
times influence ardent supporters to carefully draft statutory language in or-
der to attempt to avoid such interpretations.  Unlike the case with moderates 
and expansionist interpretations, though, it is unlikely that ardent supporters 
would refuse to support future legislation because of the possibility of con-
tractionist interpretations.  After all, unless ardent supporters fear that the 
likely judicial interpretations would be so contractionist that they would 
move the statutory meaning past the original status quo and make them 
worse off than before the legislation was enacted, they would still vote for 
legislation perceived to be beneficial. 
B. The Rules of Interpretation as Systematically Promoting Contractionist 
Interpretations 
It might seem that contractionist interpretations are sufficiently epi-
sodic that, unlike the case with the consistently expansionist statutory inter-
pretations of progressive legislation from the 1960s and 1970s, they are 
unworthy of study.  Such a view under-appreciates the systematic nature of 
narrow statutory interpretations.  Although courts purport to be the “faithful 
agents” of Congress when resolving interpretive issues, they consider the 
creation and modification of the rules of statutory interpretation to be sub-
ject to judicial prerogative.12  Many of these judicially created rules call for 
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narrow interpretations of statutes.13  Indeed, the judiciary has designed the 
rules of statutory interpretation to err on the side of contractionist interpre-
tations.  Thus, the phenomenon of contractionist interpretations is not con-
fined to those interpretations made by conservative courts hostile to 
progressive legislation or to liberal courts hostile to conservative legisla-
tion.  For example, in the case used in Part II.A. to illustrate the problems 
associated with contractionist interpretations, Justice Scalia made a contrac-
tionist interpretation of a very conservative statute.14  
Some rules in particular call for narrow statutory interpretations.  Sub-
stantive canons of interpretation, which are policy-based directives about 
how statutory ambiguity or unclarity should be resolved, almost uniformly 
direct courts to interpret statutes narrowly.15  These rules appeal to ideologi-
cally diverse interests and vary widely in their strength, but the one feature 
most have in common is that their application results in the narrowing of 
statutory language.  Thus, a statute (subjectively deemed by the judiciary to 
be less than clear) might be subject to a narrow interpretation because, for 
example, it: (1) raises serious constitutional issues; (2) has retroactive ef-
fects; (3) attempts to divest courts of judicial review or habeas corpus juris-
diction; (4) might be applied extraterritorially; (5) impacts American 
Indians or aliens; or (6) raises federalism concerns by possibly abrogating 
state Eleventh Amendment immunity, exposing states to generally applica-
ble regulations, or displacing state law in areas of traditional state concern.16 
Why are the narrow interpretations reached pursuant to these and other 
substantive canons contractionist?  The interpretations would not be con-
tractionist, of course, if they reflected legislative intent.  But two character-
istics of these rules and the manner in which they are applied make them 
contractionist, at least part of the time. 
The first is that many substantive canons are quite powerful and re-
quire courts to choose second-best interpretations that are less textually per-
 
13
  See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 
943–44, 960 (1992) (suggesting that the most significant rules of interpretation used by the Supreme 
Court narrow statutory meaning and reflect a preference for continuity rather than change). 
14
  See infra notes 35–49 and accompanying text. 
15
  See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 925(“[T]he dominant theme running through most interpretive 
guides [including substantive canons] is that close questions of construction should be resolved in favor 
of continuity and against change.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 634 (2d ed. 1995) (de-
scribing substantive canons).  
16
  See Brian G. Slocum, Canons, The Plenary Power Doctrine, and Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 363, 372–76, 401 (2007) (link) (describing the canon of constitutional avoidance, the pre-
sumption against retroactivity and the habeas corpus clear statement rule); Larry J. Obhof, Federalism, I 
Presume? A Look at the Enforcement of Federalism Principles Through Presumptions and Clear State-
ment Rules, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 123, 131–50 (link) (describing the federalism canons); Peter S. 
Heinecke, Comment, Chevron and the Canon Favoring Indians, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1025–32 
(1993) (describing the rule that statutory ambiguities should be interpreted in favor of Native Ameri-
cans). 
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suasive and less likely to reflect congressional intent.  The most powerful 
substantive canons—clear statement rules—require particularly precise in-
dications of congressional intent in order to be overcome.17  The application 
of these rules frequently results in the creation of implied exceptions to oth-
erwise unambiguously broad statutory language.18  While courts will typi-
cally defend a chosen rule on the ground that its application will result in a 
statutory interpretation that reflects congressional intent, substantive canons 
reflect the values of courts, not those of Congress.19  Rather than serving as 
gauges of congressional intent, these rules are chosen for other reasons, 
such as a desire to force Congress to expressly address issues that the judi-
ciary deems to be sensitive.20  For example, clear statement rules have been 
particularly popular with conservative Justices, as they have recently cre-
ated various clear statement rules designed to protect federalism interests.21 
The second contractionist feature of substantive canons is that courts 
do not typically consider the temporal implications of creating or broaden-
ing the strength or scope of these rules.22  One of the chronically overlooked 
and undertheorized problems in statutory interpretation is that courts fre-
quently create and modify substantive canons and other rules of interpreta-
tion but generally apply these new or modified rules of interpretation 
retroactively.23  In other words, courts do not typically consider whether 
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  Cf. Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 1959, 1959, 1972–73 (1994) (arguing that because they require such explicit statutory language, 
clear statement canons are concerned more with protecting important values than they are with capturing 
the most accurate reconstruction of congressional intent). 
18
  See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 384 (2005) (link) (“The well-
established presumption against reading a statute to operate ‘retroactively’ . . . often causes courts to in-
fer exceptions to statutory provisions whose words, on their face, appear to cover all pending cases.”). 
19
  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) (arguing that the Court’s clear 
statement rules “amount to a ‘backdoor’ version of the constitutional activism that most Justices on the 
current Court have publicly denounced”). 
20
  See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 613–46 (1995) (describing how courts use rules of interpretation to 
pursue various visions of democracy). 
21
  See Obhof, supra note 16, at 132–33. 
22
  Courts can enlarge the scope of a canon by making it applicable in cases in which it formerly did 
not apply.  See infra Part II.A. (describing how the Court has modified the scope of the canon of consti-
tutional avoidance).  Courts can make canons stronger in two different ways.  One is by making the 
canon more difficult to overcome by making its presumption stronger.  The other is by changing the 
point in the interpretive process when courts will apply the rule.  Cf. The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—
Leading Cases: Definition of “Violent Felony”, 121 HARV. L. REV. 345, 351 n.51 (2007) (link) (noting 
that much of the judicial debate over the rule of lenity has concerned whether the rule should be applied 
only after exhausting all other interpretive aids or whether it should be applied earlier in the process, 
such as before the court considers legislative history). 
23
  One exception to the automatic retroactive application of new or modified rules is that the Court 
will not apply a new rule retroactively to overturn a previous interpretation.  See John R. Sand & Gravel 
Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 755–56 (2008) (link) (refusing to overturn its previous interpreta-
tion of a statute, in which it had interpreted a limitations period as jurisdictional in nature with regard to 
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new or modified rules should be applied only prospectively to statutes en-
acted after the judicial decisions that created or modified the rules.  When a 
substantive canon is created or is modified by increasing its strength or 
scope but no consideration is given to whether the new or modified rule 
should be applied only prospectively, the end result is typically a contrac-
tionist interpretation.24  The court has changed the original meaning of the 
statute in a manner that could not have been anticipated by Congress. 
Courts attempt to legitimize rules of interpretation, and reduce criti-
cisms that the rules do not correspond with congressional intent, by assert-
ing that Congress is assumed to enact statutes in light of established rules of 
interpretation.25  It is questionable, though, how much attention Congress 
pays to the rules of interpretation when drafting legislation.26  Even if Con-
gress does consider the rules of interpretation, substantive canons (and es-
pecially clear statement requirements) have been criticized because they 
assume an unrealistic level of congressional foresight.27  Moreover, in any 
given case it is often difficult to predict how much clarity will be required 
by courts to satisfy the presumptions created by substantive canons.  In ad-
dition, the failure of courts to consider temporal issues when creating or 
modifying rules of interpretation further undermines the assumption that 
Congress is able to choose statutory language in light of the rules of inter-
pretation that will be applied by courts. 
The conclusions made above regarding contractionist interpretations 
may seem to conflict with the conclusions drawn by Rodriguez and Wein-
gast about expansionist interpretations.  According to Rodriguez and Wein-
gast, expansionist interpretations of progressive social legislation are 
problematic because moderates have relied on the possibility of these inter-
                                                                                                                           
suits against the United States, on the basis of a new rule of interpretation that created a rebuttable pre-
sumption of equitable tolling with regard to suits against the United States). 
24
  Although the trend is for the creation and expansion of canons, rather than their elimination and 
narrowing, a judge may also narrow the scope or strength of a canon, which would not produce a con-
tractionist interpretation.  The modification could produce an expansionist interpretation, though, if 
Congress relied on the originally constituted canon when choosing statutory language.  If, for example, 
the Court weakened the presumption against retroactivity, statutes enacted prior to the Court’s modifica-
tion might be applied retroactively even though at the time of the statute’s passage such retroactive ap-
plication would have been unexpected. 
25
  See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (link) (“Congress does not write upon 
a clean slate [when statutory presumptions are involved]. . . .  ‘[C]ourts may take it as a given that Con-
gress has legislated with an expectation that the presumption will apply’ . . . .”) (quoting Astoria Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 507 U.S. 529 (1993)). 
26
  See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional 
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 597–605 (2002) (link) (finding that Congress does not pay particu-
lar attention to the rules of interpretation when drafting legislation). 
27
  See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neu-
tral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2005) (stating that the Court’s use of clear statement rules 
“may be ignoring clearly discoverable legislative purpose” and frustrating the “policy preferences of the 
legislature” because they assume “an unrealistic level of congressional foresight”). 
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pretations in deciding not to support such legislation.28  As I argue above, 
however, contractionist interpretations occur in part because Congress often 
cannot predict how courts will interpret legislation.29  Perhaps our conclu-
sions differ because Rodriguez and Weingast focused on judicial interpreta-
tions of a specific type of legislation during a certain defined time period, 
while I focused on generally applicable rules.  Alternatively, perhaps inter-
pretations based on judicial findings of statutory intent or purpose are more 
predictable than interpretations based on rules of interpretation.30  The reso-
lution of such questions is beyond the scope of this Essay, but it does seem 
likely that although contractionist interpretations create other problems (as 
explained below), any polarization of Congress is not likely due to the 
manner in which courts currently interpret statutes. 
II. THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY CONTRACTIONIST INTERPRETATIONS 
A. An Example: Clark v. Martinez 
As explained above, contractionist interpretations do not raise the same 
issues as do expansionist interpretations because it is not likely that the pos-
sibility of contractionist interpretations cause moderates or ardent support-
ers to refuse to support legislation.  They should be viewed as problematic, 
however, because the interpretations, being contractionist, do not corre-
spond with legislative intent and, as Section B of this Part argues, cannot be 
legitimized on the basis that Congress can overrule them through subse-
quent legislation.  To illustrate these problems, this Essay will describe the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of one of the provisions of the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).  
It may seem odd to some that I criticize the Court’s interpretations of 
IIRIRA, which can be fairly seen as humane interpretations of a notoriously 
harsh, punitive and controversial immigration statute.31  Although I (greatly) 
sympathize with such views, one of the Court’s interpretations is undoubt-
edly contractionist and serves as an example of the problems associated 
with such judicial (contr)activism. 
In Zadvydas v. Davis,32 the Court applied the canon of constitutional 
avoidance in interpreting one of the provisions created by IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(6), which states that certain immigrants “may be detained beyond 
 
28
  See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
29
  Theoretically, if Congress could predict how courts will interpret legislation, they would be able 
to anticipate, ex ante, at least some problems and draft the legislation accordingly.  
30
  Cf. George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 326–27 (1995) (questioning 
the claim that textualism limits judicial discretion). 
31
  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 368 (2002) (referring to IIRIRA as the “toughest immigration legisla-
tion adopted in half a century”). 
32
  533 U.S. 678 (2001) (link). 
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the [90-day] removal period.”  The Court, required by the avoidance canon 
to adopt a “fairly possible” interpretation of the statute that would avoid the 
constitutional questions raised by the indefinite detention of immigrants 
who legally are considered to have entered the country, held that these im-
migrants can be detained only for a six-month period unless there is a “sig-
nificant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”33  Thus, 
as a result of the Court’s use of the avoidance canon, the holding was one of 
statutory construction that was driven by constitutional concerns.  While it 
was arguably an implausible second-best interpretation achievable only 
through the application of the avoidance canon, the statutory interpretation 
in Zadvydas was defensible considering the constitutional issues involved 
and the Court’s assertion that Congress had previously doubted the consti-
tutionality of indefinite detention of deportable immigrants.34   
The same defense cannot be made for the Court’s subsequent decision 
in Clark v. Martinez,35 where the Court extended the Zadvydas statutory 
holding to include a different group of immigrants—inadmissible immi-
grants—who have far different constitutional rights.36  In Martinez, the 
Court added a new and powerful aspect to the avoidance canon by directing 
that a statutory interpretation made by invoking the canon be uniformly ap-
plied in subsequent cases even when the later cases do not raise any serious 
constitutional issues.  The Court thus held that § 1231(a)(6) should be inter-
preted as imposing the same limitations on the detention of inadmissible 
immigrants as it found in Zadvydas were applicable to the detention of de-
portable immigrants.37 
The Court recognized that its interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvy-
das was driven by the avoidance canon.  It rejected the notion, however, 
that it needed to determine whether indefinite detention of inadmissible 
immigrants would raise serious constitutional questions before it interpreted 
§ 1231(a)(6) as similarly not authorizing their indefinite detention.38  In-
stead, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated: 
It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a limiting con-
struction called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though other of 
the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same limita-
tion.  The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern, . . . whether 




  Id. at 701. 
34
  See id. 
35
  543 U.S. 371 (2005) (link). 
36
  Id. at 386–87; see Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial Application 
of the Constitution in Immigration Law, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1023–28 (2007). 
37
  Martinez, 543 U.S. at 377–78.  
38
  See id. at 380–81. 
39
  Id. at 380–81. 
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In other words, the Court’s lowest common denominator principle 
stands for the proposition that the avoidance canon must be applied, and a 
second-best interpretation selected, even when the particular application of 
the statute before the Court does not raise any serious constitutional ques-
tions but a different application not before the Court would. 
The Court’s invocation of its lowest common denominator principle in 
Martinez had very broad consequences.  Before IIRIRA replaced the previ-
ous statutory regime with § 1231(a)(6), courts almost uniformly held that 
the Attorney General had both statutory and constitutional authority to de-
tain inadmissible immigrants indefinitely.40  Due to the Court’s use of the 
avoidance canon in Zadvydas and Martinez, the Attorney General was pre-
cluded from indefinitely detaining not only deportable immigrants, whose 
indefinite detention raises serious constitutional problems, but also inadmis-
sible immigrants, whose indefinite detention does not currently raise serious 
constitutional problems.41 
The Court in Martinez claimed that it was not adding a new element to 
the avoidance canon, stating that the “lowest common denominator” princi-
ple has always been a legitimate and necessary consequence of the invoca-
tion of the avoidance canon.42  Such a statement was rather surprising 
considering that the Court earlier in Zadvydas had emphasized the long-
standing constitutional distinction between the two classes of immigrants 
(deportable and inadmissible immigrants) and that its decision only con-
cerned deportable immigrants.43  One has to conclude that the Court was ei-
ther being disingenuous or, more likely, did not anticipate that its 
interpretation would be uniformly applied in a subsequent case.  Jonathan 
Siegel has also disputed the Court’s characterization of the lowest common 
denominator prinicple in Martinez as long-standing, claiming that the prin-
ciple is new in the sense that courts in the past have often interpreted the 
same statutory language in different ways depending on the status of the 
litigant before the court.44 
The modification and application of the avoidance canon resulted in a 
contractionist interpretation in Martinez.  As noted above, IIRIRA was a 
notoriously harsh immigration statute.  The extension of the Zadvydas in-
terpretation, through the retroactive application of a modification to a sub-
stantive canon that produces second-best interpretations, likely, and 
inappropriately, overturned settled expectations.  Congress may very well 
have relied on the old avoidance canon rule when drafting the detention 
 
40
  See Slocum, supra note 16, at 396–97. 
41
  See id. 
42
  543 U.S. at 380–83. 
43
  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (link) (“[The] cases before us [do not] require us to 
consider the political branches’ authority to control entry into the United States.”). 
44
  See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 352–65 (2005). 
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statute.  There was certainly no evidence that, when drafting IIRIRA, Con-
gress intended to take the dramatic step of removing the Attorney General’s 
longstanding power to indefinitely detain inadmissible immigrants.  Such a 
purpose would have been at odds with the overall tenor of the legislation 
and the other provisions enacted.45 
Indeed, Congress, although it did not need to do so, enacted statutory 
language in IIRIRA that made the Attorney General’s authority to detain 
inadmissible immigrants more explicit.  Prior to IIRIRA’s enactment, some 
courts found that the Attorney General had the authority to detain inadmis-
sible immigrants indefinitely through the “intersection of several statutory 
provisions,” none of which explicitly authorized indefinite detention.46  
Thus, IIRIRA’s provision that the Attorney General “may” detain immi-
grants beyond the removal period made that power more explicit.  It is 
probable that Congress would have thought (if it considered the issue at all) 
that any constitutional problems that would be raised by the indefinite de-
tention of deportable immigrants would not undermine the long-standing 
authority that the Attorney General possessed to detain inadmissible immi-
grants. 
Using the spatial model below, and assuming that harsh immigration 
legislation is conservative in nature, the Zadvydas and Martinez decisions at 
the very least changed the original meaning of the detention provision of 
IIRIRA from L to x.  Indeed, as explained above, one can make the further 
claim that the Court’s interpretations moved the legislation from L to x*, 
thereby putting the government in a worse position than before the legisla-
tion was enacted. 
 
[————x*—————Q—————x—————L————] 
Liberal       Conservative 
Figure 2 
 
By applying its modification of the avoidance canon retroactively in 
Martinez, the Court inappropriately deprived Congress of the ability to en-
act statutory language that would have accomplished its purposes. 
B. Overruling Contractionist Interpretations and Choosing Statutory 
Interpretation Methodologies  
The objectionable nature of contractionist interpretations might seem 
obvious. Some scholars have defended such interpretations, however.  Einer 
Elhauge, for example, refers to rules that run contrary to legislative intent as 
preference-eliciting rules of interpretation and claims that they are often 
 
45
  See Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 368. 
46
  Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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beneficial because they can result in more precise legislation subsequently 
enacted by Congress.47   
On its face, the idea that courts should choose statutory interpretations 
that do not reflect congressional intent conflicts with their “faithful agent” 
role and raises separation of powers issues, but other reasons also counsel 
against such interpretations.  First, while it is true that Congress monitors 
the statutory decisions of the Supreme Court, it pays far less attention to the 
interpretations made by the various courts of appeals.48  Considering that 
most statutory interpretations never reach the Supreme Court, it is unrealis-
tic to think that Congress will overrule most of the contractionist interpreta-
tions made by courts.  Second, there are many reasons why Congress may 
not overrule the contractionist interpretations of which it is aware, even if it 
disagrees with them.  For example, Congress may be focused on other more 
pressing matters, may disagree about how to resolve the issues or may sim-
ply conclude that overriding an interpretation is not politically viable.49  
Placing significance on legislative inaction has thus been widely criticized 
by scholars.50  Finally, even if Congress enacts legislation overruling a judi-
cial decision, the new legislation is often not as broad as the original legis-
lation.  If, for example, the judicial decision relied on a rule of interpretation 
such as the avoidance canon, which avoids interpretations that merely raise 
constitutional issues, Congress may be wary of re-enacting the same provi-
sion (with clearer language, of course), even if it believes that the provision 
is not actually unconstitutional. 
Demonstrating the inappropriate nature of expansionist interpretations 
made through the misuse of legislative history and contractionist interpreta-
tions made through rules of interpretation necessarily raises questions about 
proper statutory interpretation methodologies.51  Although they criticize 
how courts have used legislative history in order to reach expansionist in-
terpretations, Rodriguez and Weingast claim that their theory does not nec-
essarily support textualism, just a more sophisticated intentionalism that 
properly considers legislative history.52  At first glance, however, their con-
clusions about the importance of judicial observance of legislative deals do 
seem to give support to textualism.  John Manning argues that one of the 
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  See id. at 1229–33. 
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justifications for textualism is that its “presumption of deliberate drafting 
but untidy compromise is more respectful of the central place of compro-
mise in the constitutional design of the legislative process” than are intent 
or purpose based theories.53  A judicial presumption of deliberate drafting 
“enables legislators to rely on semantic detail to express the level of gener-
ality at which a proposed legislative policy is acceptable to them.”54  
While the idea that judges should focus on semantic details has persua-
sive force, the type of textualism that produces contractionist interpretations 
(through the retroactive application of new or modified rules of interpreta-
tion that produce second-best interpretations) should be rejected.  If textual-
ist courts truly desire to respect the semantic details enacted by Congress, a 
more moderate and carefully calibrated approach to the rules of interpreta-
tion should be pursued.  Such an approach should focus more on rules that 
are designed to capture likely congressional intent rather than promote other 
goals such as forcing Congress to expressly address issues the Court thinks 
are important.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay does not dispute Rodriguez and Weingast’s valuable dem-
onstration of how the expansionist interpretations of progressive legislation 
made by courts in the 1960s and 1970s undermined the legislative deals 
struck between ardent supporters of progressive legislation and the moder-
ate legislators necessary for passage of the statutes.  Rather, this Essay 
demonstrated that their arguments about the problems associated with ex-
pansionist interpretations are not in fact symmetrical with regard to contrac-
tionist interpretations.  Contractionist interpretations likely do not, for 
example, have the same polarizing effect on Congress as have expansionist 
interpretations of progressive legislation.  Nevertheless, as this Essay has 
argued, contractionist interpretations are problematic because they reveal a 
judiciary that is, perhaps increasingly, interested in pursuing public policy 
at the expense of Congress through the application of rules of interpretation 
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